|
State
stalking statutes that explicitly address electronic communications
|
Jurisdiction
|
Statutory
Language
|
|
Alaska |
Alaska
§ 11.41.270 Stalking in the Second Degree:
(a)
A person commits the crime of stalking in the second degree
if the person knowingly engages in a course of conduct that
recklessly places another person in fear of death or physical
injury…
(b)(1)
"Course of conduct" means repeated acts of nonconsensual
contact involving the victim…
(b)(3)
"Nonconsensual contact" includes:
(F)
Sending mail or electronic communications to that person.
(Constitutionality:
"The potential due process and overbreadth problems in the
definition of stalking do not require invalidation of the
stalking statutes; rather those problems should be resolved
on a case-by-case basis. Peterson v. State, 930 P.
2d 414 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996)

|
| California |
California
Penal Code § 646.9 -
Stalking:
(a)
Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows
or harasses another person and makes a credible threat with
the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his
or her safety,…is guilty of the crime of stalking…
(g)
"Credible threat" means a verbal or written threat, including
that performed through the use of an electronic communication
device,…
(h)
"Electronic communication device" includes, but is not limited
to, telephones, cellular phones, computers, video recorders,
fax machines, or pagers.
(Constitutionality:
"The statute prohibiting stalking is not unconstitutionally
overbroad or vague. Its application is clearly limited to
threats that find no protection under the First Amendment
and, as such, it does not implicate a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct." People v. Borrelli,
(2000, 5th Dist.) 77 Cal. App. 4th 703, 717, 91 Cal. Rptr.
2d 851.) See also, People v. Halgren (1996, 4th Dist.)
52 Cal. App. 4th 1223, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176 ("The felony stalking
statute is not overbroad and sufficiently narrowly tailored
to survive constitutional scrutiny.")

|
| Georgia |
Official
Code of Georgia Ann. §16-5-90 -
Stalking:
(a)(1)
A person commits the offense of stalking when he or she
follows, places under surveillance, or contacts another
person at or about a place or places without the consent
of the other person for the purpose of harassing or intimidating
the other person. …The term "contact" shall mean any communication
including without being limited to communication in person,
by telephone, by mail, by broadcast, by computer, by computer
network, or any other electronic device is deemed to occur
shall be the place or places where such communication is
received.
(Constitutionality:
"This section is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad."
Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590, 449 S.E. 2d 94 (1994).)
|
| Maine |
Maine
Revised Statutes § 210-A
Stalking:
1. A person
is guilty of stalking if:
A. The
person intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of
conduct directed at another specific person that would in
fact cause a reasonable person:
(1)
To suffer intimidation or serious inconvenience, annoyance
or alarm;
(2)
To fear bodily injury or to fear bodily injury to a member
of that person's immediate family; or
(3)
To fear death or to fear the death of a member of that
person's immediate family; and
B. The
person's course of conduct in fact causes the other specific
person to:
(1)
To suffer intimidation or serious inconvenience, annoyance
or alarm;
(2)
To fear bodily injury or to fear bodily injury to a member
of that person's immediate family; or
(3)
To fear death or to fear the death of a member of that
person's immediate family.
2.A. "Course
of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical
proximity to a person or repeatedly conveying oral or written
threats, threats implied by conduct or a combination of threats
and conduct directed at or toward a person. … "Course of Conduct"
also includes, but is not limited to, gaining unauthorized
access to personal, medical, financial or other identifying
information, including access by computer network, mail, telephone
or written communication. "Course of conduct" does not include
activity protected by the Constitution of Maine, the United
States Constitution, or Federal statute.
|
| Massachusetts |
Massachusetts
Ann. Laws ch. 265, § 43
Stalking:
(a)
Whoever (1) willfully and maliciously engages in a knowing
pattern of conduct or series of acts over a period of time
directed at a specific person which seriously alarms or
annoys that person and would cause a reasonable person to
suffer substantial emotional distress, and (2) makes a threat
with the intent to place the person in imminent fear of
death or bodily injury, shall be guilty of the crime of
stalking. Such conduct, acts and threats described in this
paragraph shall include, but not be limited to, conduct,
acts or threats conducted by mail or by use of a telephonic
or telecommunication device including, but not limited to
electronic mail, internet communications, and facsimile
communications.
|
| Michigan |
Michigan
Statutes Annotated §28.643(9)
Aggravated Stalking:
(d)
"Harassment" means conduct directed toward a victim that
includes, but is not limited to, repeated or continued unconsented
contact that would cause a reasonable individual to suffer
emotional distress and that actually causes the victim to
suffer emotional distress. Harassment does not include constitutionally
protected activity or conduct that serves a legitimate purpose.
(e)
"Stalking" means a willful course of conduct involving repeated
or continuing harassment of another individual that would
cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened,
intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested and that
actually causes the victim to fee terrorized, frightened,
intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.
(f)
"Unconsented Contact" means any contact with another person
that is initiated or continued without that individual's
consent or in disregard for of that individual's expressed
desire that the conduct be avoided or discontinued. Unconsented
conduct includes, but is not limited to:
(vi)
Sending mail or electronic communications to that individual.
(Constitutionality:
"A Federal appeals court upheld Michigan's anti-stalking law,
rejecting a convicted stalkers argument that the law was to
vague and violated his free-speech rights." Source:
AP, 2/06/01; http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=12851)
|
| Oklahoma |
21 Oklahoma
St. § 1173
Stalking:
(A)
Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows
or harasses another person in a manner that:
(1)
Would cause a reasonable person … to feel frightened, intimidated,
threatened, harassed, or molested; and
(2)
Actually causes the person to feel frightened, intimidated,
threatened, harassed, or molested, upon conviction shall
be guilty of stalking …
(F)(1)
"Harass" means conduct directed toward a person that includes,
but is not limited to, repeated or continued unconsented
contact, that would cause a reasonable person to feel suffer
emotional distress, and that actually causes emotional distress
to the victim. Harassment does not include constitutionally
protected activity or conduct that serves a legitimate purpose.
(F)(4)
"Unconsented Contact" includes, but is not limited to:
(f)
sending mail or electronic communications to that individual.
|
| Pennsylvania |
Pennsylvania
Consolidated Statutes § 5504
Stalking by Communication or address:
(A.1)
A person commits the crime of stalking by communication
or address when the person engages in a course of conduct
or repeatedly communicated to another under circumstances
which demonstrate or communicate either of the following:
(1)
An intent to place such other person in reasonable fear
of bodily injury.
(2)
An intent to cause substantial emotional distress to such
other person.
(F)
Definitions:
"Communicates."
Conveys, without intent of legitimate communication or
address, by written or electronic means, including telephone,
electronic mail, Internet, facsimile, telex and similar
transmission.
|
| Washington |
Washington
Revised Code § 9A.46.110
Stalking:
(1)
A person commits the crime of stalking if, without lawful
authority and under circumstances not amounting to a felony
attempt of another crime:
(a)
He or she intentionally or repeatedly follows another person;
and
(b)
The person being harassed or followed is placed in fear
that the stalker intends to injure the person, another person,
or property of the person or of another person. The feeling
of fear must be on that a reasonable person in the same
situation would experience under all of the circumstances;
and
(c)
The stalker either:
(i)
Intends to frighten, intimidate, or harass the person;
or
(ii)
Knows or reasonably should know that the person is afraid,
intimidated, or harassed even if the stalker did not intend
to place the person in fear or intimidate or harass the
person.
(4)
… "Contact" includes, in addition to any other form of contract
or communication, the sending of an electronic communication
to the person.
(Constitutionality:
"This section is not unconstitutionally overbroad nor unconstitutionally
vague." State v. Lee, 82 Wn. App. 298, 917 P.2d 159
(1996), aff'd, 135 Wn.2d 369, 957 P.2d 741 (1998).)
|
| Wyoming |
Wyoming
Stat. § 6-2-506
Stalking:
(a)(ii)
"Harass" means to engage in a course of conduct, including
but not limited to verbal threats, written threats, vandalism
or nonconsensual physical conduct, directed at a specific
person …which the defendant knew or should have known would
cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional
distress, and which does in fact seriously alarm the person
toward whom it is directed.
(b)
Unless otherwise provided by law, a person commits the crime
of stalking if, with intent to harass another person, the
person engages in a course of conduct reasonably likely
to harass that person, including but not limited to any
combination of the following:
(i)
Communicating, anonymously or otherwise, or causing a
communication with another by verbal, electronic, mechanical,
telegraphic, telephonic or written means in a manner that
harasses.
(Constitutionality:
"The Wyoming stalking statute is not void for vagueness, nor
is it subject to constitutional attack as being overbroad."
Luplow v. State, 897 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1995).
|
|