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Case
Backgrounds.
Case
1 Background
West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943)
Jehovah's Witnesses
believe that saying a pledge of allegiance to a flag is forbidden
by the Ten Commandments. The Jehovah's Witnesses also wanted to
show their solidarity with fellow believers in Germany who had refused
to give the "Heil Hitler" salute.
In the 1940
Minersville School District v. Gobitis case, the Court ruled
that children of Jehovah's Witnesses must participate in the flag
salute in public school. The Court said that the flag is a symbol
of national unity and the pledge was necessary to promote patriotism.
The West Virginia
Board of Education in 1942 required all teachers and students to
say the pledge and "participate in the salute honoring the Nation
represented by the Flag." Objections to the required salute "being
too much like Hitler's" were raised by the Parent and Teachers Association,
the Red Cross, the Boy and Girl Scouts and the Federation of Women's
Clubs. The salute was modified, but no concession was given to Jehovah's
Witnesses.
Barnette, a
Jehovah's Witness, did not allow his child to participate in the
flag salute. His child was expelled. West Virginia officials threatened
to send his son to a state reformatory. Barnette was subject to
a fine and jail. Lower appeals courts held that the Gobitis
precedent meant Barnette had no protection under the First Amendment.
Before the
Court:
Argued
on March 11, 1943
Decided on June 14, 1943
Key Question:
May individuals be forced by the government to participate in practices
that are prohibited by their religion? May the Supreme Court overturn
decisions of a previous Supreme Court?
Case
2 Background
Welsh
v. United States (1970)
Various religions,
such as the Society of Friends (Quakers), oppose war in any form.
A 1940 U.S. law exempted persons from military action if they opposed
all war due to their "religious training and belief." In 1948 Congress
defined "religious training and belief" as "an individual's relation
to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from
any human relation, but [not including] essentially political, sociological,
or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."
A 1965 Supreme
Court case further defined beliefs sufficient to qualify for exemption.
Justice Clark stated the new rule as "a sincere and meaningful belief
which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to
that filled by God."
Welsh was convicted
of refusing to be drafted into the Armed Forces. He claimed he was
a conscientious objector. His opposition to war did not arise
from religious objections. He could not affirm or deny belief in
a "Supreme Being," he stated in his exemption application. However,
he did believe strongly that killing was immoral and totally repugnant.
Before the
Court:
Argued on January 20, 1970
Decided on June 15, 1970
Key Question:
Does the statutory definition of conscientious objector include
a sincere and meaningful belief that occupies in the life of its
possessor a place parallel to the place filled by God of those admittedly
qualifying for the exemption?
Case
3 Background
State
of Wisconsin v. Jonas Yoder, et. al. (1972)
Jonas Yoder
and Wallace Miller were members of the Old Order Amish religion.
Adin Yutzy was a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church.
Amish belief dates back to the 16th century and the Swiss Anabaptists.
Old Order Amish communities are devoted to a life in harmony with
nature and soil. Both religions require a simple life apart from
worldly influences.
All three parents
refused to send their children, who had finished eighth grade in
the local public school, to high school. The children were 14- and
15-year-olds. Wisconsin law required attendance until students reached
age 16.
There are penalties
for breaking the law. The parents were each fined $5.
Before the
Court:
Argued on December 8, 1971
Decided on May 15, 1972
Key Question:
Did Wisconsin's requirement that all parents send their children
to school at least until age 16 violate the First Amendment by criminalizing
the conduct of parents who for religious reasons refused to send
their children to school?
Case
4 Background
Oregon
Employment Division v. Smith (1990)
Alfred Smith
and Galen Black were members of the Native American Church. Some
of the church's rituals involve the use of peyote, a cactus derivative
containing the hallucinogen mescaline. The two men ingested peyote
during religious rituals. As a result, they were fired from their
jobs at a private drug rehabilitation program for "work-related
misconduct."
When Smith
and Black filed for unemployment benefits, they were turned down,
again because of their use of peyote, possession or use of which
was a crime, according to Oregon law. Although drug use in religious
ceremonies is exempted from criminal penalties by federal law and
by the laws of 23 states, Oregon provided no such exemption. The
men sued, saying that the state had violated their rights to free
exercise of their religion
Before the
Court:
Argued on November 6, 1989
Decided on April 17, 1990
Key Question:
Does Oregon's state law violate the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment?
Case
5 Background
Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah (1993)
Members of
the tiny Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye in the Florida city of
Hialeah practice a religion that involves the sacrifice of live
animals such as pigeons, chickens, goats and lambs to commune with
the "orishas" or spirits. The religion of Santeria-"the way of the
saints"-originated in West Africa. When
they were brought to Cuba as slaves, the Yoruba people blended their
beliefs with some Roman Catholic practices. Nearly 70,000 Cuban-Americans
in south Florida practice Santeria, as do people in other cities
across the United States.
When the Church
of Lukum Babalu Aye decided to establish a house of worship and
other facilities in Hialeah in 1987, the city council held an emergency
session. It issued new zoning laws that banned animal sacrifices
inside city limits. The new laws specifically banned the killing
of animals for ritual purposes. They exempted the killing of animals
for food; for pest control; during hunting, trapping and fishing
seasons; for medical research; and by animal shelters for purposes
of population control. The church sued, claiming its religious freedoms
had been violated by the new zoning laws.
Before the
Court:
Argued on November 4, 1992
Decided on June 11, 1993
Key Question:
May a city constitutionally enact ordinances that are designed to
prohibit certain religious practices?
BACK
Role
Cards.
Case
1 Defendant Role Card
West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943)
Defendant:
Barnette
— Claiming freedom of religious beliefs
Main Points
- The First
Amendment clearly allows me and my children to have freedom of
our religious beliefs. Our church, the Jehovah's Witnesses, is
well established and has hundreds of thousands of members nationwide.
- We believe,
as the Bible teaches, that we can worship only one God. The Ten
Commandments teach "You shall have no other gods before me," and
"You shall not make for yourself an idol." Therefore we are bound
by the Lord's commandments not to worship any image, including
the American flag.
- We do respect
the American flag and acknowledge it as a symbol of freedom and
justice.
- Children
of Jehovah's Witness Church should not be punished by expulsion
or reform school for simply holding their personal religious beliefs.
- Dissent
and disagreement in our free country are not signs of weakness,
but rather of our strength as a people.
Case
1 Plaintiff Role Card
West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943)
Plaintiff:
West Virginia State Board of Education
— Claiming societal and national values supersede religious
values
Main Points
- The nation
is engaged in a struggle for its existence in World War II. We
cannot tolerate disrespect for our flag even in peacetime, but
certainly not in these dangerous times.
- The Supreme
Court ruled just three years ago in the Gobitis case that
students may be mandated to salute our flag. West Virginia is
following a clear legal precedent.
- As Justice
Frankfurter said in Gobitis, "national unity is the basis
for national security."
- Patriotism
and political responsibilities to the community outweigh any single
individual's religious freedom.
Case
2 Defendant Role Card
Welsh
v. United States (1970)
Defendant:
United States
— Claiming Welsh cannot be protected by the Free Exercise clause
Main Points
- The First
Amendment protects only the "free exercise of religion." Mr. Welsh
proclaims no religion, and the First Amendment is therefore irrelevant.
- No religion
is involved here. It is up to the government to decide what grounds
are sufficient to qualify for conscientious-objector status.
- Congress
specifically prohibited granting conscientious-objector status
to persons claiming to object on the basis of a merely personal
moral code. Mr. Welsh is acting on just such a personal code.
- Our nation's
security demands well-equipped armed forces. This requires drafting
men into those forces. Congress does not intend to make it easy
to avoid the draft.
Case
2 Plaintiff Role Card
Welsh
v. United States (1970)
Plaintiff:
Elliott Ashton Welsh II
— Claiming free exercise of personal beliefs
Main Points
- I believe
that human life is valuable in and of itself; therefore, I will
not injure or kill another human being.
- At the time
of my registration for the draft, I had not yet come to accept
pacifist principles. My views developed in subsequent years. That
is when I filed with my local draft board for conscientious-objector
status. I object to war in any form and could not live with my
conscience if I were forced to participate in the military.
- I believe
that our military complex wastes both human and material resources.
In conducting war, we are failing our responsibilities as a nation.
- Though not
a believer in any given religion, I have profoundly held convictions
that war is wrong.
- The Universal
Military Training and Service Act violates the First Amendment
prohibition of establishment of religion.
Case
3 Defendant Role Card
State
of Wisconsin v. Jonas Yoder, et. al. (1972)
Defendant:
Jonas Yoder
— Claiming free exercise of religion
Main Points
- Requiring
my children to go to high school will necessarily expose them
to worldly values, which we do not believe in.
- The Amish
religion requires us to lead simple lives apart from the rest
of the world. Amish people have done this very well for hundreds
of years.
- We will
be censured by the church community. Compliance will endanger
my own salvation and that of my children.
- The First
Amendment guarantees us the right to our religious beliefs. This
is not possible if our children are taken away from the Amish
community to attend high school.
- Elementary
school is allowed according to Amish belief because students learn
the basic three R's there. In Amish society, there is no need
for the intellectual and scientific curriculum taught in high
schools.
- The Amish
provide continuing informal vocational education that prepares
our children for life in our community.
Case
3 Plaintiff Role Card
State
of Wisconsin v. Jonas Yoder, et. al. (1972)
Plaintiff:
State of Wisconsin
— Claiming greater social good limits religious expression
Main Points
- The State
of Wisconsin requires children up to age 16 to attend school for
a good reason. All children are entitled to a quality education
to prepare them for the future. Public high schools bring together
students of different backgrounds so they may learn to live together,
sharing and learning from each other.
- If Amish
children choose as adults to leave the Amish community, they will
be ill-prepared to deal with the non-Amish world unless they have
the chance to attend high school.
- Meeting
the educational needs of children is one of the most important
duties of the state. As Thomas Jefferson emphasized, "some degree
of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively
and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve
freedom and independence."
- Education
prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants
in society.
- The public
expects that all children, regardless of their religion, will
have the chance to get an education at public expense until they
are 16.
- The Amish
may freely practice their religion, but the State believes the
education of children outweighs the argument about free expression
of religion in this case.
Case
4 Defendant Role Card
Oregon
Employment Division v. Smith (1990)
Defendants:
Alfred Smith and Galen Black
—
Claiming free exercise of religion
Main Points
- Use of peyote
has been a part of the religious rituals of the Native American
Church for centuries. Twenty-three states and the federal government
recognize our right to free exercise of our religion by exempting
our use of peyote from their drug laws.
- Use of peyote
in religious ceremonies is nothing like the irresponsible recreational
use of unlawful drugs that the state of Oregon wishes to control.
Peyote is used in prescribed ways and poses no danger to anyone
else. Thus, the state does not have a compelling interest in regulating
use of peyote in the Native American Church.
- Our right
to exercise our religious beliefs was violated by the state of
Oregon Employment Division when it denied us unemployment benefits.
- The "misconduct"
provision under which we were disqualified for unemployment compensation
was to preserve the financial integrity of the compensation fund,
not to enforce the State's criminal laws.
- Previous
Supreme Court cases (Sherbert v. Verner, for one) determined a
State could not determine availability of unemployment insurance
based upon the willingness of an individual to give up conduct
required by his religion.
Case
4 Plaintiff Role Card
Oregon
Employment Division v. Smith (1990)
Plaintiff:
Oregon Employment Division
— Claiming Smith and Black are not protected by the free exercise
clause
Main Points
- State law
is very clear that possession or use of peyote is a crime. Thus,
evidence of its use is cause for dismissal from a job at a drug
rehabilitation program. People who are fired for cause are not
eligible for unemployment benefits.
- The state-and
in fact the entire country-faces a serious drug problem. To solve
the problem, tough laws are needed. Because of the seriousness
of the drug problem, the Oregon state legislature chose not to
make exemptions in the law for religious use of drugs. Because
of the drug crisis, the state's interest in regulating drug use
is more important than the defendants' right to free exercise
of their religious beliefs.
- The "prohibiting
the free exercise [of religion]" clause does not relieve an individual
of the obligation to comply with a law that incidentally forbids
(or requires) the performance of an act that his religious belief
requires (or forbids) if the law is not specifically directed
to religious practice.
- In previous
Supreme Court cases involving religious practice and unemployment
compensation, the conduct in none of the cases was prohibited
by law. The State is free to withhold unemployment compensation
from individuals "engaging in work-related misconduct, despite
its religious motivation."
Case
5 Defendant Role Card
Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah (1993)
Defendant:
City of Hialeah
— Claiming that certain religious practices can be limited
when they pose a particular threat to public health
Main Points
- Followers
of the Santeria religion mistreat animals that are sacrificed
and fail to dispose of them in a sanitary manner.
- The city
of Hialeah has found remains of decapitated animals, which caused
the city very particular problems related to public health. There
are compelling government interests in preventing public health
risks.
- The secret
nature of the Santeria religion made unenforceable a regulation
of disposal of animal carcasses.
- Public outcry
followed announcements of the church's intention to put up a building
in a downtown lot as a place to conduct animal sacrifices.
- Spokespersons
for the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
claim that the Santeria religion is not legitimate in the context
of modern America.
Case
5 Plaintiff Role Card
Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah (1993)
Plaintiff:
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye
—
Claiming free exercise of religion
Main Points
- The ordinances
were passed against the Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye. City Resolution
87-66 notes "city residents' 'concern' over religious practices
inconsistent with public morals, peace, or safety, and declares
the city's 'commitment' to prohibiting such practices."
- The zoning
law barring animal sacrifice unfairly singles out an unpopular
minority faith in violation of the Constitution's guarantee of
religious freedom.
- The government
has shown no compelling interest in enforcing a statute that affects
the followers of the Santeria religion
- The sacrifice
of animals is central to the beliefs and practices of the Santeria
religion. The orishas are powerful, but not immortal. Their survival
depends on the sacrifice. Animals are cooked and eaten following
all Santeria rituals excepting healing and death rituals.
- The zoning
law is a direct attack on a religious practice rather than a neutral
law that only incidentally affects a church
- The sacrifice
of animals as part of religious rituals has ancient roots. The
Old Testament mentions animal sacrifice. The annual Muslim Feast
of Sacrifice continues a centuries-old tradition.
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